From Times Online

February 3, 2010

Airlines in the United States have been told to review their flying standards after the crash of a commuter jet was officially blamed on elementary error by the captain.

The crash of the Colgan Air turbo-prop, which killed 50 people at Buffalo, New York, a year ago, was caused by Captain Marvin Renslow pulling the control column the wrong way, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said in its report on the accident.

The warning over poor performance on the flight deck echoed a view among experts in the US and Europe that some pilots lack old-fashioned skills in the automated cockpits of modern airliners.

On the Colgan Bombardier airliner, an automatic “stick shaker” vibrated the columns to alert the pilots that the aircraft was flying too slowly as it approached to land at Buffalo. Mr Renslow, 47, pulled back, raising the aircraft’s nose. This triggered an aerodynamic stall, sending the Bombardier airliner into an uncontrolled dive to the ground. All 49 onboard died as well as a man on the ground.

All pilots, from their first lesson, are taught never to raise the nose of an aircraft that is close to stalling. Lowering the nose — which is counter to instinct — increases the speed of the air over the wings, ensuring that lift is maintained.

The NTSB said: “The captain’s response to stick shaker activation should have been automatic, but his improper flight control inputs were inconsistent with his training and were instead consistent with startle and confusion.”

Neither the captain or Rebecca Shaw, the 24-year-old first officer, appeared to have recognised that the aircraft was approaching a stall, it said.

The NTSB also noted a series of failures by the crew on the airliner, which was operating as a Continental Connection flight. Ms Shaw sent text messages from her mobile telephone while preparing for take-off from Newark, New Jersey. There was a misunderstanding between captain and co-pilot on the setting of a minimum speed alert. Before take-off the captain set it at a higher than standard speed to allow for possible icing but the co-pilot was unaware of this. Neither noticed ample visual warnings that speed was dropping to the minimum. There was unnecessary chatter between the crew. Ms Shaw was also tired from flying cross-country overnight to start her shift and she was suffering from a heavy cold.

The NTSB called on airlines to improve their crew training and procedures. That echoed an internal report in Air France last year, which raised the alarm over complacency and told its pilots that they needed to brush up on their technique as aviators. They should spend time hand-flying small aircraft, it told them.

The NTSB report also warned against the dangers of using mobile telephones and other appliances while in the pilot’s seat. “Distractions caused by personal portable electronic devices affect flight safety because they can detract from a flight crew’s ability to monitor and cross-check instruments, detect hazards, and avoid errors,” it said. Similar advice came after the incident last autumn when a Northwest Airlines aircraft overflew its destination airport in Minneapolis because the pilots’ attention was focused on a discussion that involved using their laptop computers.

The NTSB noted other factors related to the Colgan crash, on a snowy night on February 12, 2009. Captain Renslow had failed five performance checks over the course of his flying career, although his employer knew of only three. The crew had failed to follow standard procedures for communicating between themselves and cross-checking their actions.

Contrary to earlier assumptions on the accident, the aircraft was not suffering from iced wings when it slowed to land. When the stick-shaker began, the aircraft was not yet in a stalled state. The smooth air-flow over the wings and tail was only disrupted when he pulled back on the column, over-riding the stick-pusher that comes into action automatically as a last resort on the edge of a stall.

Deborah Hersman, head of the NTSB, said that the accident casts doubt on the safety standards at regional US airlines compared with the major carriers.

By Kevin Smith, Staff Writer Sgvtribune.com

Posted: 01/07/2010 11:13:58 PM PST

A federal investigation is under way to determine the cause of a helicopter crash in the Sierra Nevadas that occurred Wednesday when the craft hit an unmarked Southern California Edison power line.

Three state scientists and the pilot of the Bell 206 helicopter were killed when the copter clipped a skyline grounding wire between two Edison transmission towers, igniting a fire that consumed the craft and sent debris flying.

The team had been conducting a deer survey in a craggy stretch of the mountain range where electric lines crisscross the canyons.

Edison spokesman Steve Conroy acknowledged the line wasn’t marked but said the utility was never asked to do so – by the FAA or any other agency.

“Those lines have been sitting up there since the 1950s when they were installed,” he said. “We’ve never been approached by any external parties, private or governmental, to install markers on the lines.”

Conroy said Edison transmission lines in the Antelope Valley and some other regions are marked, likely as result of construction guidelines in those areas.

“At the end of the day, we’re trying not to lose sight of these four people who lost their lives as a result of this,” he said. “It’s important for us to see the outcome of the investigation so we can determine what steps we need to take to avoid having this happen in the future.”

The investigation will likely consider such factors as line visibility, aircraft speed, a possible mechanical malfunction and pilot error.

“The FAA does not require that power lines be marked because we do not have authority over local developments/projects,” FAA spokesman Ian Gregor said in a statement. “However, we recommend that all power lines be marked to make them as visible as possible to pilots.”

And it would be the responsibility of the power line owner/operator to do that, he said.

The FAA offers the following recommendations”

Markers should be placed on transmission wires and support structures to minimize the chance that pilots could inadvertently fly into them

Markers on long wires across canyons, lakes and rivers should be at least three feet in diameter

Markers should be a bright color that’s easy to see, such as orange, white or yellow, as well as an alternating color scheme

Markers should be spaced about 200 feet apart in equal intervals (When lines are low to the ground or near an airport a closer spacing is recommended)

National Transportation Safety Board investigators will spend the next two weeks examining the wreckage and radar and air traffic control data, as well as interviewing eye witnesses before issuing a preliminary finding about the probable cause.

If it’s determined that SCE – a division of Edison International – shirked its duty to mark the power line, it could be held partially legally responsible for the crash, experts said.

Published October 8, 2009 (AP)

WASHINGTON — A medical helicopter that crashed in South Carolina last month, killing three crew members, lacked safety features recommended by experts, a federal official said Thursday.

National Transportation Safety Board spokesman Peter Knudson told The Washington Post for a story posted on its Web site that the helicopter did not have night-vision equipment or a system to warn the crew that it was flying too close to obstacles or the ground. The NTSB has urged medical helicopter programs to adopt each of those features, saying they could have prevented some accidents.

Neither a call nor e-mail placed by The Associated Press to Knudson was immediately returned.

The helicopter had just dropped off a patient at a Charleston hospital on Sept. 25 and was flying to Conway, about 90 miles to the northeast, when it crashed in Georgetown County.

NTSB board member Robert Sumwalt had said the helicopter had flown between two intense thunderstorms and it was raining when it crashed. He could not say if the conditions were a factor and no cause has been determined.

In addition, the weather station at the Georgetown County Airport was not working because of a lightning strike Sept. 4 “that completely fried the equipment” and was awaiting repairs, said Jamey Kempson, an airport engineer with the South Carolina Aeronautics Commission.

Prior to the crash, the Federal Aviation Administration said the pilot last radioed air traffic control at 11:05 p.m., saying the crew was about four miles from an airport near Charleston and had it in sight. It crashed about 25 minutes later.

Crew members killed were pilot Patrick Walters, 45, of Murrells Inlet; flight nurse Diana Conner, 42, of Florence; and paramedic Randolph Claxton Dove, 39, of Bladenboro, N.C.